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I have used a proposition developed in Kerry Howe's seminal work Where the Waves 
Fall ( 1984) to offer an explanato.ry framework for .understanding industr.ial relations in the 
South Pacific. The paper conce~ates on applying this analysis to a key moment in Western 
Samoan indus~ial relations, .the 1981 public service strike. The key concept used in this 
analysis is .mutual adjustment. The concept refers to an interactive process be.tweenforeign 
institutions, such ~as trade unions, and pre-existing institutions and values like fa' a Samoa 
(the cultural and political value system of Western Samoa). While the 1981 strike, and South 
Pacific industrial relations i.n general, can be interpreted from a nwnber of pe~spectives rhe 
approach used .in .this paper may offer a method that does no.t obscure the full interplay 
between West,ern values and i.nstitutio.ns and .local forces. 
This article examines the background and events surrounding the 1981 public service 
strike in Western Samoa. At the time the s~e was described as the most important event 
in modem Samoan history second only to the Mau rebellion against the New Zealand 
administration (Pacific Islands Monthly, July 1981, p:13).1 From 6 April to 2 July 1981, 
a period of 90 days, Western Samoans experienced for the frrst time a prolonged period of 
organised industrial unrest which affected the vast majority of Western Samoa's small but 
vital wages and salary sector. The 1981 strike brought into sharp focus a number of issues 
including the dynamic interaction between tradition and modernity in the process of 
institutional transfer, the role trade unionism can play as a vehicle for ~elite mobilisation, 
especially on a generational basis, and the trend from localisation to politicisation of the 
Samoan labour movement These factors have continued to play fundamental parts in 
Western Samoan politics in the decade since 1981. The industrial tunnoil of 1981 represents 
a watershed in Western Samoan labour history and is therefore a convenient te1xninus for this 
particular study. 
I have analysed the strike, and consequently the role of the Public Service Association 
and the Western Samoan government, as an aspect of the process of mutual adjustment in 
tetrns of institutional transfer. From this perspective the 1981 strike was a sharp confrontation 
between adopled European institutions and value systems (of both the strikers and the 
government) with Samoan values .and methods of dispute settlement The first part of this 
article explains the fotm of analysis I hav.e used Secondly, the article concentrates on trade 
unionism in Western Samoa until the end of the strike in 1981 . 
• Lecturer in Law, Univ.ersity of Tasmania. Australia 
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Institutional transfer 
Studies of trade unionism in the South Pacific are in their infancy comparatively. This 
interest is growing for the South Pacific region while trade union studies in other regions are 
on the decline (Hess, 1986; Leckie, 1990). There has been a surprising shortfall in academic 
writing on trade unions in developing countries (Sclafani, 1977). The surprise is caused by 
the discrepancy between the amount of available material and the acknowledged importance 
of trade unions. This importance was particularly stressed in the political science literature 
devoted to modernisation studies (e.g., Kassalow, 1969, pp.303, 308-320; Friedland, 1972). 
Despite prominence being given to ttade unions and their roles in various literature, especially 
modernisation studies or works on dependency theory, there exists only a relatively small 
number of individual studies of trade unions or single country case studies (see 
Friedland,l972; Epstein, 1978; Tyler, 1982; Kassalow, 1969; Ananaba, 1979). 
A proposition borrowed from Pacific historiography provides an interesting analytical 
framework to study the development of trade unionism within the South Pacific region. This 
proposition was advanced by Kerry Howe in Where the Waves Fall (1984). He considered 
that studies of the South Pacific have tended to downplay the degree and dynamic nature of 
the interplay between local culture and institutions with external forces. The argument is that 
a process of mutual adjustment occurs with changes taldng place within the local system and 
upon the introduced institution. 
I have examined the merits of this argument using the Public Service Association of 
Western Samoa (WSPSA) as an example of institutional transfer to W~estern Samoa 
accompanied by a process of mutual adjustment The 1'981 strike serves as an extremely 
useful centre piece because it represented such a clear clash between the forces of modernity 
and tradition. The strike also demonstrated that mutual adjusonent is not necessarily a 
peaceful process . Felise Va'a has described the conflict between the WSPSA and the Public 
Service Commission (PSC) in the following manner: 
In Western Samoa's recent pas~ only the Mau Movement may have provoked divisive, 
emotional responses comparable to those engendered by the strike. Families often were split 
apart over the issue, with members supporting either the PSA or the PSC. Coming in the 
fmal year of Tupuola's three-year teun, the strike became its dominant event and it was 
responsible directly for the decline and fall of his political empire as it existed up to that 
time. With virtually every public servant on sttik:e, able to recall with some bitterness the 
hunger, deprivation and financial insecurity caused by it, Tupuloa's government had many 
determined opponents as the 1982 elections approached. 
Even in industrialised Western societies, s~es by public servants - a fairly recent 
phenomenon - arouse considerable public disquiet. The situation was even more pronounced 
in w ,estem Sam~ which has no tradition of trade union activity or strike action, a social 
sttucture based upon close-knit family ties and ;consensual decision-making processes, and 
a very large public service in proportion to the total workforce (Va'a, 1983, p.9l). 
Mutual adjustment 
Mutual adjustment, as a descriptive te1n1, covers an interactive process between 
introduced elements and pre-existing institutions and values. The teun mutual does not 
presuppose that this interaction occurs on the basis of equality between the introduced and the 
pre-existing ,elements. The relationship is not symmetrical. Often the initial stage of this 
interaction sees a domination by the introduced values or institutions over their pre-existing 
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counterpans. Despite an apparent initial domination the more fundamental pre-existing 
elen1ents force an adjusru-ent in the introduced institution to accommodate them. With time, 
more of the pre-existing elements tend to re-emerge onto the public arena. Nevertheless such 
a process usually produces imponant qualitative and quantitative changes to the arrangements 
in place prior to the introduction of these external values and institutions. 
Mutual adjustment and its application to Western Samoa 
Howe (1984) has made a very strong case for the suitability of using the idea of 
mutual adjusnnent or a process of accommodation to pre-colonial studies of the South Pacific. 
The concept of mutual adjustment appears to provide a more sensitive f1atocwork within 
which to analyse the interaction between European influences and the indigenous political 
system. I would argue that the mutual adjustment model is a much more sensitive analytical 
approach and has a better explanatory value than approaches based around the often used 
traditional versus modem polarity (see Riggs 1967, 317-349; Rustow, 1968; Huntington and 
Dominguez, 1975, pp.1-114; Larson, 1980; Hoogvelt, 1977, chapter 3; Rivkin, 1969). Mutual 
adjustment centres attention on the process and impact of change. This approach also avoids 
the neglect of pre-existing institutions and values in academic fields outside anthropology. 
Recourse to a mutual adjustment approach avoids settling for an institution transfer 
fotmula that posits "x was totally replaced withy". Rather it considers whether x persists and 
if so the nature and fotm of x. This ap~oach also considers what, if any change, has occurred 
to the nature and function of y as a result of the dynamics of its interaction with the culture 
or system that produced x. Kerry How,e advanced the proposition that the process of 
interaction between Islanders and Europeans was heavily influenced by the initiatives of 
Islanders and by their social and political arrangements rather than by European decree. This 
proposition is by no means l)nique to Howe (see Davidson, 1967). Howe has restricted his 
arguments to the period of precolonial culture contact in the South Pacific. However he 
argues that the relevance of his thesis is becoming more apparent in relation to the post-
colonial experiences of South Pacific countries. 
The remainder of this article deals with a brief history of trade unionism in Western 
Samoa, especially the Public Service Association, up to the end of the 1981 strike. The strike, 
and consequently the role of the WSPSA, is analysed from the perspective of a process of 
mutual adjusttnent. What occurred was a sharp confrontation between adopted institutions and 
value systems (by both strikers in the fmm of a trade union and the government in the fonn 
of legislation based on Western premises of industrial relations) with Samoan values and 
methods of dispute settlen-ent. 
Trade unionism in Western Samoa 
Unionism in Western Samoa, until the 1970s, appears to have been low-keyed, for 
some years largely the reserve of New Zealanders working in the public service and in later 
years as an arena for factional struggles between public sector workers. This apparent state 
of affairs may only be due to a lack of field studies. The other interesting and associated 
feature is the high level of dual membership especially at the executive level between the 
public sector unions, especially between the WSPSA and the Weste1u Samoan Teachers' 
• 
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Association (de Bres, 1980, p.l ). The WSPSA claims to have been the only union in Western 
Samoa in the early 1950s but the Western Samoan Teachers' Association also dates its 
beginnings from the 1950s. 
Private sector unions or labour organisations have been rare in Western Samoa. There 
has been a small group of pilots called the Western Samoan Airline Pilots' Association and 
an association of taxi drivers, whose principal role was to lobby for higher fares for owner 
drivers (de Bres, 1980, p.3). Giv~en the public sector dominance of the small salary and wages 
sector of the Western Samoan economy this absence of privat~e sector unions prior to the 
1980s is not surprising? 
Industrial action in Western Samoa prior to 1981 
A general pattern of spontaneous walkouts rather than organised, p~emeditated 
industrial action marked the history of industrial relations in Western Samoa until 1980 (de 
Bres, 1980 pp . 2-3). The 1981 strike presented the Western Samoan government with a new 
type of problem, organised industrial action within the strategically vital but numerically small 
wages and salary sector. More importantly this occurred within the previously tranquil arena 
of government employment. It also featured a conflict between fa' a Samoa and an institution 
modelled on W~estern values, a trade union, the newly refottned and reconstituted WSPSA.3 
Prime Minister Tupuola, after the 1981 strike, said "It's true the~e were strikes before - but 
never at such strength.'' (Pacific Islands Monthly, July 1981, p.l3). 
The Public Service Association of Western Samoa 
The WSPSA has been the largest and most active public service employee organisation 
in pre and post independence Western Samoa. The following material on the early period 
of Western Samoan trade unionism and the WSPSA, in particular, relies heavily on Joris de 
Bres's 1980 ~eport. The organisation had a chequered history with several metamorphoses. 
It began life as an association of New Zealanders working in the colonial administration 
prior to 1962. During the latter years of the 1960s and the majority of the 1970s the WSPSA 
appears to have been a typical white collar compliant union which caused governments little 
angst and struggled to maintain membership or generate inteliest among members. In mid 
1978 the WSPSA was formally deregistered for failing to lodge annual returns and accounts. 
During the years 1979-1981 the WSPSA was resurrected largely due to a contingent of 
younger activists and a degt ~ee of assistance from the New Zealand Public Service 
Association. Prior to the 1981 strike the membership of the WSPS.A had reached 3,000 but 
this was still only about 40 percent of its total potential membership. 
Af~er independence in 1962, the WSPSA largely served as an umbr,ella organisation 
whose executive positions served .as items of contention by various sectional groupings of 
public servants. The groupings consisted of nurses, teachers, post office workers and members 
2South Pacific Commission. 1981 pp.22-29. The actual nwnber ,of public servants in 1981 was approximately 7,000 w1th 
a further 2.000 people employed by the Western Samoan Trust Estate Cotporarion. The total wages and salary sector was 
about 16,000 employees including police. politicians and legal officers. 
3Fa' a Samoa (the Samoan W.ay) is the tenn used to describe the cUlture of Samoa. 
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of tbe Marine Depuaraent. There is no indication, in de Bres's repo1t, wby these positions 
would be a source of such contention. If the union was on the wane during this pe1iod the 
ptim of office holding would appear relatively unirnpouant One possible answer could be 
tbat, althoup ~elatively powerless and ineffectual, the ceremonial and prestige values attaching 
to union positions would serve as a source of fa' a Samoa prestige. This fou•,al pmstige would 
belp tbe incumbents in their dealings with the govaauncnt involving the interests of their own 
sectional and fanrily suppo1 ters. 
The origins of the 1981 dispute can be baced back, at least in pan. to the passing of 
tbe Samoan Public Service Act ( 1977). The Act was modelled closely on the New Zealand 
State Services Remuneration and Conditions of Employnent Act 1977. However the Samoan 
Public Service Act ( 1977) had no provisions for arbittation and conciliation in the event of 
a dispute nor any require••aent to consult employees or their tepresentatives when changes 
wete made to working conditions (Wood, 1980). The provisions for the public service were 
in contrast to the New Zealand act and the legislation covering employment in the Samoan 
private sector, the Labour and Employnent Act 1972 (see Tuiasau, 1982, pp.7S-76). The 
ondssion and the associated political attitude that led to the exclusion of these provisions was 
to be one of the major points of contention during the 1981 strike. Marion Wood claimed 
that: 
Philipp Muller, fOJDICr ~PSC said dial provisions fm' conciliation and arbib'ation 
CODI8ioed in earlier drafts of the biD were excluded because the prevailing aaiblde among 
politicians was anti-unioa and without from employee organisations, these 
provisions were lost along the way without any strong paotest being made (SavtJli, 20 
February 1980). 
In 1979 the WSPSA re-e••erged onto the industrial relations scene in Western Samoa. 
It presented its papers for incotpotation to the Registrar of Incotporated Societies claiming 
coverage of all public servants, including teachets and statutory authmity staff, but not the 
2,000 staff employed by the Westetu Samoan Trust Estate Cotpotation. A general meeting 
of over 400 public servants voted in favour of the proposed WSPSA constitution and 
structure. The previous problem of executive dotninance by sectional interests was dealt with 
by tbe aeation of a nine ••-ember Management Council on which each sectional grouping was 
restricted to a maximum of two representatives. 
Jmnvdhuely after the new WSPSA was fot•ned union officials voiced a number of 
concetns about the 1977 Public Service Act. Such matters of concetn not only included the 
absence of dispute settling procedures but also discrepancies in conditions of service in 
comparison to wage workers in the private sector. Similar concerns were raised by the PSC. 
The problen•s for the PSC cenbed on the absence of dispute settling procedures but extended 
10 the of provisions allowing the PSC to cope with any industrial unrest especially 
in providing essential services. The government considelcd the legislative shortcomings 
IW"'POI'I"t u industrial action appelled to be totally alien to the operations of fa' a Samoa. 
a strike problem. in the eyes of the polirical leadcnbip, would not eventuate. If 
IUCb action was to occur the traditional dispute settUng procedures of fa' a Samoa would come 
iDto play and avett any serious trouble. 
Af1ar 1'179, with the revival of the WSPSA and the potendal problems with the 1977 
all the inpedients for a process of mutual adjus1nent to occur were in place. 
adopting industrial legislation on foreign models but omitting 
cauponents widl the expectation that · Samoan elenM:nts would 
and exclusions. a younger generational 
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group with leadership aspirations, not accommoda~ed as yet into the traditional power 
structure, had with considered deliberation adopted an institutional structure derived from 
foreign sources, a trade union. Third, this new institution operated on the presupposition that 
dispute settling procedures granted a rough equivalency in bargaining position between the 
warring parties. The concept of bargaining ·equivalency, on these grounds, was totally alien 
to the mindsets of the political leadership of Western Samoa. Prior to 1981 a strike within 
the public sector would have been considered by the government unimaginable or at the very 
least, just another conflict to be resolved in the notmal Samoan way. 
The 1981 strike: immediate cause of the str.ike 
The immediate cause of the outbreak in industrial unrest was the extreme vulnerability 
and fragility of Western Samoa's subsistenoe economy. From 1962 onw,wds the Weslem 
Samoan economy remained seriously weak. 1979 statistics show how the economy relied 
almost exclusively on two principal exports, copra (54 percent) and cocoa (23 percent). The 
Samoan workforce was concentrated in primary p~oduction (approximat~ely 80 percent) 
especially in subsistence farming. A series of trends continued during the 1970s which 
threatened Samoa's already weak economy. Population levels continued to rise but were not 
accompanied by an increase in food production. Export production volumes had significantly 
decreased during the previous 20 years. The 1973 oil crisis and the subsequent world wide 
~economic recession exert·ed tremendous strains upon Western Samoa's exports and imports. 
Gov~ernment response to the economic problems 
After a series of solutions had proved ineffectual in significantly redressing the 
problems facing the W~estem Samoan economy the government turned to more drastic 
remedies. In June 1979, the dollar was devalued by 15 percent. Intefest rates, petrol prices 
and electricity charges were incteased. Within two days of the devaluation announcement, 
officials of the new WSPSA had met and discussed their reactions. The WSPSA resolved to 
pursue a 30 percent wage increase for its members. 'The union sought to preserve the 
standaJid of living for public servants who ·were largely dependent upon purchased goods and 
subject to traditional demands upon their cash incomes from their aiga (family group) and 
village. After negotiations, between the PSC and the WSPSA, a compromise solution was 
reached, but not fotmally approved by cabinet until later in the year. The agreement was for 
a 10 percent increase in June 1980 and a 12 peocent second phase increase to follow in 
January 1981 (Tuiasau, 1982, p. 78). 
The government without explanation, in December 1980, decided to ignore the 
agreement When the fmancial estimates for 1981 were tabled in parliament they contained 
provision only for an 8 percent second phase increase to be paid in two stages separated by 
a six month interval, as opposed to the WSPSA-PSC agreement of an immediate 12 percent 
incliease from January 1981. As a compromise the Cabinet approved amendments to the 
Income Tax Act to provide an inc1ease in the level of non-taxable income so as to boost the 
take home pay of wage workers . 
The WSPSA executive's reaction to the government's decision was to treat the breach 
of agreement as an industrial dispute. New to such action, the union executive was faced 
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with the major problem of running such a dispute. The Cabinet backdown on the 
WSPSA-PSC agreement had shown that pressure on the PSC would not be effective. To 
undertake strike action was seen as a measure of last resort The union faced problems in 
undenaldng such drastic action only 25 months after its re-establishment. There were three 
key stumbling blocks. First, the union executive did not know how their recently recruited 
membership would respond to such a call to industrial action. Second the very concept of 
strike action was alien to traditional Samoan approaches to dispute settlement. Third, the 
union leadership risked the possibility of being labelled traitors to Western Samoa 
developnltnt and posing a serious threat to their families by shutting down the key public 
sector upon which many Samoan families relied for access to cash. 
Kinloch (1982) has provided an analytical framework using the dispute settling 
procedures of fa' a Samoa to interpret the 1981 strike. This framework dovetails with the 
concept of mutual adjustment The model has a number of stages patterning the nonnal steps 
in Samoan dispute resolution. First, a di3agieement is created. Secondly, the parties set 
about gathering support for their claims. During this process neither pany will directly speak 
to each other. Third, a meeting is arranged where the parties work out their r~espective 
rankings and where the onus on proving a claim lies. Fourthly, the lesser ranking participant 
then must by feference to genealogy, oratory, and if need be force, argue their case to be 
treated as meriting serious treatment as equals or superiors on this matter. Fifthly, the parties 
now deal directly with ,each other. Finally if no consensus is reached and reconciliation is 
not fonhcoming, one side seeks judgement from a superior forum. 
Kinloch, s model of disputes within fa' a Samoa began with disagreement, and this was 
clearly the fmt step in the 1981 strike. Breaking with tradition the WSPSA decided to avoid 
the fa' a Samoa approach to dispute settlement and opted for 'the characteristic trade union 
procedure of direct confrontation. The WSPSA decided to exploit the government's relatively 
weak position within the parliament. On 1 December 1980 about 4,000 people marched to 
present a petition to parliament. One report (Wend4 1981, p.53) suggests that the WSPSA 
executive expected very few public setvants to respond to their call for a march and were 
pleasantly shocked by the numbers who heeded their call. The petition was initially rejected 
by the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly on the grounds that Part XV, Article 30 (1) of 
The General Legislative Assembly Standing OrdeiS required that "A petition may be presented 
to the Assembly only by a member, who shall affix his name in the beginning thereof." 
Eventually the petition was presented to parliament by Vaai Kolone, the leader of the 
opposition Human Rights Protection Pany. The petition requested: 
a) a 10 percem wage increase from l July 1980 for public servants. 
b) a small wage increase for all wage wotkers frau 1 July 1980. 
c) a 12.5 percent wage increase from 1 January 1981. 
The petition was given to the Parliamentary Petition Commission to examine. The 
Committee consisted only of government members. Not surprisingly the union organised 
petition for a salary/wage adjustment was rejected by the Committee's report, tabled in 
parliament on 18 December 1980 (Savali, 24 December 1980). The Committee met on 12 
occasions with 34 witnesses. Ulualoaiga Talamaivo Niko, Chairman of the Committee, 
recommended that parliament approv,e an eight percent increase in wages and salaries from 
1 January 1981 and that $350,000-$500,000 be allocated to allow interest free loans to public 
servants. The Committee specifically advised all public servants to "avoid being involved in 
politics." This report also estimated that the WSPSA requests would cost about $3.4 million 
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and was thus unaffordable given Western Samoa's economic fragility. The recommendations 
of the Committee were ratified by the Assembly and thus it appeared that the WSPSA 's 
gamble of bypassing the Cabinet had failed. 
The use of a petition as a means of dispute settlement caused great concern for a 
number of parliamentarians because of a pefceived incompatibility between the WSPSA's 
methods and fa' a Samoa. A petition, especially direct from citizens rather than via local 
marai, was a rare device for Western Samoan politics although a no1rnal Westminster 
procedure. The parliamentary debate on the petition indicated that some politicians 
consideJied that the mafch and the petition were "un-Samoan" and an "insult" to them as 
members of parliament and as matai . (Wendt, 1981, p.53). 
Key events during the strike 
On the 21 March 1981 the WSPSA met and invited its membership to air vie·ws about 
the Assembly's decision. After this it was decided by the WSPSA executive that a letter 
should be sent to the Minisrer of the PSC requesting similar increases as those contained in 
the alfeady rejected petition. The Minister was given until 31 March 1981 to reply. U the 
WSPSA executive considered his answer was unsatisfactory a strike would be called on 6 
April 1981. The go¥ernment responded that while they were willing to enter negotiations 
these should occur through the PSC and its Minister, not at a politicallev~el and certainly not 
with a threat of a strike being held like a 'gun to the head'. On the 6 April the WSPSA 
Executive met and carried a motion that a strike would be called for an indefinite duration 
(Savali, 26 June 1981). 
The ·first month of the strike clearly demonstrated a process ·where the whole 
relationship between trade unions, strikers and fa' a Samoa ~came into bitter conflict. 
Government representatives staned to relate the strike to a potentially serious threat lo fa' a 
Samoa. Throughout the strike the Prime Minister made many references to the fact that he 
considered "the nub of the problem in the continuing public service strike in Samoa is trying 
to fmd a way to slot unionism into the fa' a Samoa." (Kinloch, 1982, p.167). 
In tetrns of the analytical model adopted from Kinloch the second and third stages 
occurred during this period. Stage two ~occurred with each party setting out to amass support 
for their respective claims while the thini stage of determining the status in formal Samoan 
rank between the participants was also a major theme during this period of the strike. 
Prime Ministerial statement 
The WSPSA had demonstrated the support for its claims by several means. First, the 
4.,000 strong protest march, in December 1980, which resulted in the petition to parliament. 
Second, the leader of the Human Rights Pro~ection Party had deliv~ered the petition to 
parliament Third, most public services ·were severely affected from day one of the strike 
with essential services only manned on an emergency basis. Fourth, by the end of April three 
more mass demonstrations in Apia had been held to demonstrate the WSPSA' s level of 
suppon. Fifth, a strike fund of $3,000 had been raised by the WSPSA. Sixth, the WSPSA 
President, Ieti Tulealo, le~t for Pago Pago to contact and solicit overseas trade unions, 
especially public service associations, for support. Finally, the ~economy was starting to suffer 
• 
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Durin& late April and early May 1981 ne continued between the WSPSA, the 
maponsible for the public and the PSC Qai•n••n. It quickly bec•u;e evident 
tblt lbe oriJinal issue of the sa ike, sala•y inaeues, wu replaced in imponance by tbJee other 
The1e issues wae the Jeinslale*•PCnt of ltlikels, dispute settle••ent procedures, and the 
ofuniordsn• andjd'a SIIIIIOG. 1be question of~instatenootnt arose because under 
the provisioas of the Public Service Act, a public wbo wu absent for 11101e than two 
flcm d"Cir workplace, without valid reason, autmn•tica11y f01feited their office. 1be 
1977 Act did not, in the inteipetation of the gove1aunent, recognise strike action as 
coastitutina a valid reason for absence fiom the workplace. 
Tbe basis for the govein"+ent's non-~gnition of the validity of the strike for 
pwposcs rested on two pmanises. First, that tbe Assembly which passed the Act 
~~~~ -~ deleted provisions relarin1 to strikes. Therefore the current govmnment could not 
ialapet the Act to mad those se••-e strike provisions back into the Act. Second, the 
ICJVU""rent felt that it bad no mandate to accept strikes as pan of the social and political 
of Westmn San101. 
1be question of dispute seulen-cnt pmcedn•es continued to bcconc increasingly 
u the sa ike continued 1be WSPSA pushed for recourse to independent arbitration 
anda the Arbiaation Act of 1976. The govei11n-cnt ~ejected this argun-cnt on the sanae 
u its refusal to MCOgnise saikets 11ndcr the Public Setvice Act. The government 
that when passing tbe 1976 Act, never intended it to apply to strikers. 
, d11rins the closing stages of the strike, in a letter of 12 June 1981 addressed to the 
of the PSC, Aliimuauua Esekia, the WSPSA maintained that there was "a real need 
far PSC to 1IIF the govann-ent to p101110te legislation to introduce conciliation/arbitration or 
dispute 10ttle••ent procedl••es in the public service as exist in the Labour and Employ••aent Act 
1972" (StiWili, 26 June 1981). 
A clear conflict along the lines of fo1•nal status detetndnation occurred early in the 
sa ike. 1be WSPSA petitioned P1inc Minister, Tupuola Efi, calling for the agnation of Asi 
Bilreoc, Minis~er for the PSC. 1be deanand followed a nceting between the WSPSA and 
Bt1reue the WSPSA wete disndssed as they "did not match up in rank to justify their 
liafn1 down to discuss ... " (Kinloch, 1982, pp.164-16S). Eikene viewed the position between 
llimlelf, u 1qnesenting the govmn••;cnt, and the WSPSA Executive as that of a contest 
b6tr.veea an ali' i (chief) and a taule' alt' a (untided youth). Therefore in his mind there was 
DO nait in the WSPSA's challenging the govanncnt 
The of unionism and its place, if any, within fa' a Samoa was a constant thread 
the saike. 1be Plesident of the WSPSA wu inteiviewed on a New hiland radio 
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program and was reponed to have said that faJ a Samoa and unionism were not incompatible 
and in any event fa' a Samoa was open to wide interpretation (Kinloch, 1982, p.l67). Tupuola 
Efi speaking on New Zealand radio towards the end of the strike made the following 
comments: 
a method of solving industrial problems had to be fitted into the very core of our soul, so 
that it is pan of our bloodstream. Although there would be resistance, the test of leadership 
would be to make it pan of the heritage of the people, without upsetting the applecart This 
is what the test is about, this is why the strike is raking so long., this is why we are 
agonising, groping for a nonn. It would take time to work to a consensus. If we play it 
wrong then we are going to sow the seeds of something we are going to regret in the future 
... This is what it is about It is not merely a question of money, of the cost of living, it's 
more a question of what motivates people, what values they have, how do we go about 
deciding these things (Kinloch, 1982, p.l67). 
Intervention by the Prime Minister. 
The next significant event during the strike was the direct intexvention of the Prime 
Minister on 29 April 1981. Until this point Tupuola Efi had refused any direct involvement 
in the day-to-day dealings with the WSPSA. His decision in part reflected the increasing 
seriousness of the effects of the strike and the growing impasse betw~een the WSPSA executive 
and Eikene. According to Kinloch's model the fourth stage of the dispute had been reached. 
The WSPSA faced with a refusal by the government to accept the union leadership., as having 
insufficient traditional status, resoned to force in the fo1n1 of a strike. This forced the Prime 
Minister to negotiate directly with the WSPSA and thus in fa' a Samoan teirns treat the union 
leadership as being fo1mally recognised. 
Initially the Prime Minister's effons seemed to have broken the impasse. After 40 hours 
of continuous discussions a softening of positions started to emerge. 'The WSPSA modified 
its demand for retrospecrivity of salary increases naming February 1981 as the new 
commencement date. The government still maintained that salary increases could only apply 
from June 1981 but offered to set up a special independent commission to look into the 
question of salaries. The ~Commission was to be chaired by Tofllau Eti with a membership 
rep~esenting various community interests. The fmdings of the Commission were to be binding 
on the gov~emment. The WSPSA was offered the opportunity to help draw up the 
Commission's tetms of reference and select its ·membership (Savali, 26 June 1981 ). 
Nevenheless the Prime Minister's intervention made no funher ground lowards achieving 
a full settlement of the strike. While the parties seemed to have come closer on the issue of 
salaries the question of reinstatement became a greater obstacle. The WSPSA refused any 
involvement with the proposed Commission and insisted that the disput~e should be put to 
arbitration under the 1976 Arbirration .Act. The government advised the PSC, who accepted 
the advice, that all strikers be offered a return to work under the tel n1s of a grant of special 
leave with a full guarantee of status and entitlements. The WSPSA rejected this offer. It 
seems that the WSPSA wanted the reinstatement mechanism of the Public Service Act 1977 
used so as to legitimate the current strike and the general issue of a "right to strike." (Sava/i, 
26 June 1981). 
a 
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Appeals to higher forums 
The final period of the strike revolved around the participants seeking judgen.cnt from 
various authorities. This COIIesponds to the final staps of Kinloch's model. As the conflict 
could not be settled via reson to status considerations each pany now sought to settle the 
mauer in a biJher fOI&Jm. Drawina from Kinloch's anaiOJY the parties wem now 
seuleacc:nt in bodies akin to the village council (jono ) or the Land Tides Coun. As with 
other types of disputes the art is to seek judgen-cnt in a fmum that is likely to be the most 
synepatbetic. The govetrnucnt sought fint to resolve the strike by appealing to the Executive 
Council. In tum the Council sought to resolve the dispute by usin1 a conunission of enquiry 
whose findings were to be final. The WSPSA, while continuing the strike and other fo1ms 
of protest action, sought to resolve the dispute in Westeln Samoa's Supreme Court. In the 
final settleanent of the dispute both of these dispute resolution avenues played key roles. 
Tbe Executive Co••ncll and Commission of Enquiry 
On 7 May 1981 the highest f01•nal decision-making body in Weste111 Samoa, the 
Executive Council met to consider the strike (Pacific Islands Monthly, July 1981, p.13). The 
Executive Council comprised the Head of State, Malietoa Tanumafili, the Cabinet, and the sole 
••+ember, at that time, of the Council of Deputies. This decision making body qualifies for the 
title "highest" not only on the grounds of its fo1• nal constitutional supremacy but from its 
standing within fa' a Samoa. Tanunafili was by sections of the WSPSA for his 
involvenent in this cuceting (Wendt. 1982, p.53). That criticisrn appears paradoxical given 
previous c•Us from the WSPSA for the Head of State to interVene in the dispute to dissolve 
parlianent and/or sack the govannenl 
The Executive Council made three decisions · g the strike. First, a Co•nmission 
of Enquiry would proceed. Secondly there would be no pay for sbikeis for the period they 
were on strike and thirdly the offer of a special grant of leave would be withdrawn by 4pm 
11 May 1981. The WSPSA responded to this deadline with a protest march of 10,000 
suppotters on 11 May. The next day the Pii••-e Minister and the WSPSA nlltt for the last time 
and direct negotiations were abandoned. On 14 May the P1inre Minister declared that the 
Executive Council's decisions represented the gove.thntent's final position (Pacific Islands 
Monthly, July 1981, p.13). On 22 May Tlw StlnltHUI Times mpottcd that 60 percent of public 
set vants were still on strike. The weekend of 23-24 May saw a two day strike by Elecaical 
Power Col potation workers in suppca t of the stl ike. 
The Con11nission of Enquiry initiaJJy u-ct on the 11-12 May 1981 to draw up a list of 
potential witnesses and to amnge sitting tiu;es and locations. As Tile Launa, the 
Public S& vice Association ~epresentative, did not aay of tbe sittings of the 
Cot•nnission. The Con,.•rission held two sepa•ate in Apia and aDd for two days 
on Savaii.4 A total of SS witnesses appean!Al the bat no 
appcmcd representing the views of the sttikers or of die WSPSA • • 
five of the witnesses were flom the Savaii and the 
Twenty 
of 51•••11 
~ llleiDben of lbe IIi(~ Williate.l lpa (Secreuly). Tlld 
Su' Rudy, aad S.. Tevila. See 2lllflr 1111 IDr a .. of ....... wilD ......-1 
belen lbe Conuni•lioiL 
• 
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planters. They advocated a reduction in the numbers of public servants, an increase in the 
efficiency of the public service, and for any wage increases to public servants to be matched 
by concessions to agricultural producers. 
The Commission submitted its inrerim report on 29 May 1981 and the Ex~ecutive Council 
fully endorsed the Commission's findings the next day. In fotmulating its proposals the 
Commission had been instructed by the Executive Council to have special regard to any 
impact on the cost of living in W~estem Samoa, the general state of the Western Samoa 
economy, and to the ways and means of increasing current revenues to match any proposed 
salary increase and to detei •••ine effects of such measures. While the Commission of 
Enquiry's report resolv~ed the dispute over wages it failed to address the further issues of 
reinstatement, d.isput~e settle.ment procedures and the interaction between fa' a Samoa and trade 
• • 
umorusm. 
The Commission recommended salary increases for the public servants on a sliding scale. 
At one end of the scale the lowest paid workers received a 32 percent salary increase. This 
was progressively reduced for higher salaries to a minimum increase of 5 percent for senior 
public servants. The salary increases were to be effective from 1 June 1981. 'The 
Commission stated that the wage increases w~ere substantial when "considering the state of the 
economy and in particular the export earning capacity of the countty" (Savali, 22 July 1981 ). 
The Commission's other fmdings included that the public service was overstaffed by 20 
percent, the role of the PSC as an employment agency would need to be changed due to the 
cost of the proposed wage increase, and that there would need to be a reassessment by the 
government with "regard to depm unental functions and responsibilities and manpower 
requirements in the light of the overall economy of the country." (Savali, 22 July 1981). 
The news of the government's approval of the Commission's proposals for wage increases 
was released via radio on 30 May (Savali, 26 June 1981). The WSPSA Executive met on 
June 1 and decided to continue demonstrations during the Independence Day Celebrations with 
the focus on the question of reinstatement and some fotm of payment to offset. losses during 
the strike. The main hope for success for the WSPSA on the issue of reinstatement was the 
legal action they had instituted in the Supreme Court of Western Samoa. 
The events surrounding the 19th annual ~celebrations of Western Samoa's independence 
reflected the depth of the social divisions caused by the strike. The gov~emment restricted 
official functions to one day, June l, instead of the nouual three day period of cel~ebrations. 
The WSPSA used the following two days to demonstrate the strength of their supporter' s 
backing, including the holdings of pro-WSPSA festivities and a march by 10,000 supporters. 
The Observ.er of 5 June commented: "If public attendanc~e at the two separate independence 
celebrations is a criterion indicating in which direction public sympathy and support were 
bending, then the WSPSA nilly was decidedly the one" (Pacific Islands Monthly, July 1981 , 
p.68) . 
. Supreme ·Court case 
When discussions between the WSPSA and PSC became deadlocked the WSPSA solicitor, 
.Aeau Semi Epati, sought a Supreme Court declamtory judgment on three matters. These 
matters were fmally decided by ·Chief Justice St John on 9 June 1981. 
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Question 1. Could arbitration under the Arbitration Act 1976 be used to resolve the 
current indusuial dispute between the PSA and the PSC? 
The Chief J usti.ce ruled that since none of the panies had taken the matter 
to arbitration it was a hypothetical question on which he could make no decision. 
Quesdoa l. What was the proper operation of the 1978 Public Service Regulation 13 
Special Leave? 
Regulation 13 teads: Special Leave; In special circumsWlces the PSC may 
grant any employee special leave of absence with or without pay on terms and conditions 
it deems fit. 
The ~Chief Justice ruled tha1 once an employee of the public service had 
been absent for the requisite 14 days. he was automatically dismissed from the service and 
Regulation 13 coUld not be ,applied to a non-employee. 
Question 3. What was the proper procedure for valid reinstatement under the Public 
Service Act 1977? 
Section 39 of the ~blic Service Act 1977 states: 
Unauthorised Absence (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of SS32.33 and 
34 of the Act an ~employee who absents himself :from duty, or who fails to 
return to duty, and (in either case) continues lO be absent without 
pennission for a period of not less than 2 weeks shall be deemed to have 
forfeited ,office. 
(2) If the employee subsequently satisfies the Commission that there is a 
valid reason for his absence and for his failure to inform 'the Commission 
earlier of the reason the Commission may reinstate the employee; and in 
such case the employee Shall be deemed not to have forfeited office, but to 
have been on leave without pay from the public service during the period 
of absence. 
The ruling srated that "the commission could not come to the decision that the striking 
officers had a valid reason for ,absenting themselves from wort.."' 
To help the PSC overcome the problem of appearing to 'legitimate' all strikes, St John 
noted that this action was an administrative decision and thus no binding precedents would 
be set if the PSC decided to reinstate strikers this time. On the frrst day of hearings (5 June 
1981) the government fot•••ally announced the full recommendations of the Commission of 
Enquiry on wage increases for public servants. The WSPSA withheld any comment or 
reaction to the government's announcement declaring that any response would have to await 
the outcome of the Supreme Coun case (Savali, 26 June 1981)~ 
A slow end to the strike 
After 8 June, the WSPSA and PSC reopened negotiations on the basis of the Supreme 
Coun declaration. The court judgment was only concerned with the conditions under which 
the public service would return to work if an agreement was negotiated between the WSPSA, . 
PSC and the government. It was not concerned with the actual tetms and merits of the wage 
case. The WSPSA put forward its proposals on the wage claim and reinstatement to the PSC 
in writing and the PSC provided a written response. The PSC then announced that pet rnanent 
'Thia section iJ taken &om Tui•au. 1982, pp.80-1. 
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public servants would be reinstated while casual staff would be re-employed at the discretion 
of the various departmental heads. There was a last minute hiccup that threatened the 
settlement but this was quickly resolved (Pacific Islands Monthly, August 1981, p.l5). The 
strike fotn1ally ~ended on 2 July 1981 after nearly 90 days of industtial unrest. In assessing 
the success of the strikers Meleisea noted that in the long run no salary increase was paid and 
therefore ultimately 'the strikers were the losers (Meleisea, 1987, p.233). 
Fa'a Samoa and tr.ade unionism 
The 1981 strike represented, on one level, a clash between the demands of a foreign institution 
based on Western liberal democratic precepts and the demands of fa' a Samoa. Kinloch ( 1982, 
p.l63) noted that the union leaders borrowed the mechanism of the strike and atte.mpted to 
give it meaning in the context of Samoa culture. As a dispute solving mechanism in Samoan 
society the strike was an alien, and therefore difficult beast for Samoans to deal with. The 
1981 strike demonstrated the u ethods used by Samoans to accommodate seemingly 
incompatible ideas and institutions. Albert Wendt (1981, p.56) noted: "Trade unionism is here 
to stay. Some of us welcome it and believe our culture can accommodate it like it 
accommodated ·Christianity, parliamentary democracy, rugby football, boxing and icecream,.. 
The government came under strong criticism for attempting to break the strike by urging 
the matai to use their traditional authority to influence strikers to return to work. The strikers 
felt angry at the matai who they saw as trying to infringe their right to undertake industrial 
action against the government. Other matai who did not follow the government's advice wer~e 
seen by fellow matai as refusing to uphold the existing balance of authority in Samoan 
society.6 The use of matai is a classic means of resolving disputes within Samoan society. 
Throughout the stri.ke both sides attempted to gain legitimacy within the perspective of the 
ideals and norrns of fa, a Samoa but at the same time wanted to slot unionism into fa, a Samoa. 
This was often ,difficult because the strike revealed the very strong hold that families and 
villages still held over urban based civil servants. The WSPSA was only able to prolong the 
strike for as long as it did because the strikers went into the villages and garnered support 
~especially in the fotm of food (Kinloch, 1982, p.l66). Meleisea observ~ed of the strike and 
its effects that "it is still impossible for Samoans to rise above the pressures of aiga and 
traditional status values and collective loyalties" (Meleisea and Schoeffel, 1983, p.l08). 
Kinloch ( 1982, p.171) made these observations about the strike: 
They resolved a ~conflict they had generated by importing an institution from another culture. 
They did :not succeed in establishing the right to strike but they did succeed in establishing 
precedents for resolving future industrial disputes. Above .au the precedents thus established 
·while not wholly Samoan are well grounded in Samoan tradition. 
In many ways the analysis I have presented of the 1981 strike is an extension and 
development of Kinloch's approach. The benefits of applying the concept of mutual 
adjustment, to accompany an analysis like Kinloch's is a sharper focus on the interactive 
process between external and internal elements of Western Samoan industrial relations. This 
study raises a number of further important considerations about trade unionism in Western 
Samoa. I have left uncovered the period from 1981 to the present day because I feel it 
warrants its own special study. Such a study would need to include the role of women within 
'Kee.sing' s Conlempo~ary Archives. September 1983, 32370-32371. 
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the union movement and the conttibutions made by the Western Samoan trade union 
movement to the labour movement in the region and within international forums. Other issues 
would include the nature of the relationship between Western Samoan trade unions and 
political parties or groupings like the Human Rights Protection Party, and the impact that trade 
unionism had on the changes to Western Samoa's electoral system during 1990 and 1991. 
From the perspective of the analysis used in this study the most pressing research would be 
directed at examining the accommodations made in the nature and operations of the WSPSA 
after a dozen or so years of operation since its re-emergence in 1979. 
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